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The Presence of Place in Literature – with a Few Examples from Virginia Woolf  
Henri Lefebvre has said that “any search for space in literary texts will find it everywhere and in 
every guise: enclosed, described, projected, dreamt of, speculated about” (Lefebvre, 1974, 15). This 
is the horror – or the joy – that soon announces itself to any new student of place in literature: place 
emerges as, and through, a massive complexity of socio-cultural structures and relations, behaviour 
and practices, language and discourses. Added to that, it is a product of historical and natural forces 
as well as of bodily perception, emotions and the imagination. In other words, the question of place 
in literature has overwhelming ramifications. For this reason I will limit this article to touch only on 
one possible angle out of an endless range of approaches. I want to concentrate on the bodily 
experience of place in literature, or how place may be called forth in language and literature as a 
physical, sensory experience. Later, I will offer a few examples from Virginia Woolf’s Mrs 
Dalloway (1925). The reason why I choose this angle is that discourse analysis and concerns with 
socio-cultural meaning have dominated the reception of literature for so many years, always with a 
tendency to ignore, or even invalidate, physical dimensions of reality and the realm of the body. In 
response to this disproportion in the general reception of literature, I find it necessary in this article 
to stress the sensory reading of place rather than blending it forthright with other, e.g. discursive, 
approaches to place (such blending of approaches could develop along the lines of Lefebvre’s idea 
of the materialisation of social space and I will briefly point to this below). Moreover, to speak 
about the bodily experience and the physicality of place, in literature or in any other connection, is 
sometimes seen as a reactionary or essentialist stance. So let it be known from the start that I do not 
intend to suggest any disclosure of the essence of things, or a genius-loci. I am not interested in 
verisimilitude either, and my basic stance is that bodily perception is on the whole blended with 
imagination and encultured meanings. But any such blending also means that the ideational realm 
and cultural meanings are affected by preconceptual bodily experiences, and this is what I will be 
delving into: along the lines of thinkers like Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, I will look at “phenomena and 
conditions that contribute to the production of meaning without being meaning themselves” 
(Gumbrecht, 2004, 8).1
At one point Edward Casey expressed a quite common scepticism about the place of 
place in literature: Echoing the lessons of Lessing in 1766 that poetry is not at all like painting, he 
said that place is relegated to a minor issue in literature because literature engages in narrative 
rather than description. Whereas description is to engage in spatiality – shaping images of objects 
and phenomena – narrative engages in time: it deals with action and the succession of when rather 
 
                                                          
1 I subscribe to Gumbrecht’s understanding of meaning as a distinctly conceptual form of making sense of the world, or 
the kind of knowledge “that gives higher value to the meaning of phenomena than to their material presence”. It is the 
kind of analytical meaning that “never...emerge[s] without producing effects of distance” (Gumbrecht, 2004, 81, xiv, 
137). Or the kind of functional or utilitarian meaning that we attribute to a thing, which is often based in economic or 
socio-cultural outlooks on the world. Above all, it is the kind of discursive meaning we are looking for when we 
interpret a text; the kind of meaning that reduces the world to a measure of readability or intelligibility, rendering 
everything knowable. However, like Gumbrecht, I see nothing wrong with meaning, I only want to show other 
fundamental ways in which we connect with the world that undoubtedly play into the way in which meaning is formed. 
What is at stake in this article is “an intelligence of the body”, in Lefebvre’s terms, that exists prior to the analysing 
mind, or “separating intellect”, that splits the self from our immediate bodily interaction or, we might even say, a 
complex inter-being with matter (Lefebvre, 1974, 174). 
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than questions of where (Casey, 2002, 163). The most celebrated slogan of literature is not once 
upon a place, but once upon a time and it seems to be all about what happens next. Or, in Casey’s 
terms, literature does not have the quality of a visual image as pure display, or “sheer show” in itself 
(Casey, 2002, 164). 
However, it is with good reason that Casey ultimately remains sceptical of this 
proposition, since in all literary texts there is both narration and description: there is narration in 
description, certainly, but there is also description in narration. We could also say that although the 
narrative element may be busy fixing the meaning of description, there is always more than the 
narrative can hold – description always spills over the sides of narration. Take the way landscapes, 
the climate and meteorological phenomena are often employed in the service of describing 
characters’ states of mind – these are images of physical spaces subsumed in the narrative, yet they 
may also be visually or sensorily fascinating in themselves, standing out as spectacles of placeness, 
or evocations of particular, local place experiences.2
Yet, in this article I am interested in particular situations in literature where spatiality, 
or placiality thickens: when action and plot and character and even discourse and meaning recede 
somewhat into the background. As Erich Auerbach says, when spatiality thickens in literature, the 
reader may be left to wander a bit and no longer concentrate on plot or action or crisis alone 
(Auerbach, 1942-45, 11). The situations that I am concerned with may exemplify moments in 
literature, or even a level in literature, that can be experienced as emptied of narrativity. A quite 
concrete illustration of this can be found in the modern novel that in itself often contests and rejects 
plot and narrative in its structure (and thus turns out to be more spatially, or platially orientated than 
we usually suppose: Bakhtin, for one, says that the primary principle in the chronotope in the 
modern novel is time, due to the now severed link with the crude physicality of the world and 
natural phenomena. In the modern novel, he says, the latter had “ceased to be a living participant in 
the events of life” (Bakhtin, 1937-8, 217)). In the second half of the previous century there was an 
ongoing debate on the spatiality versus the temporality of modern literature initiated by Joseph 
Frank’s “Spatial Form in Modern Literature” (1945) in which he attempted to discontinue the 
fixation on time in the reception of modern writing. This is a longer discussion that I intend to deal 
with elsewhere, while, for the time being, I will restrict myself to parts of this issue of spatiality in 
fiction as it was recently raised by two Danish scholars, Frederik Tygstrup and Karen-Margrethe 
Simonsen. In a joint article Tygstrup and Simonsen speak of what they call plateaus in modern 
literature. These are instances, they say, in which the setting is emancipated from its subservience to 
the narrative chain of plot and action – instances where setting, or space or place, come to stand out 
as “an autonomous field of aesthetic composition” (Tygstrup and Simonsen, 2004, 204).  
 
Tygstrup and Simonsen compare these instances or situations with the still lives that 
we know from the art of painting where a composition of material objects are made to stand forth in 
                                                          
2 Here text-world theory also shows that the worlds of the text are not only built through description, or by names of 
objects and phenomena, locatives and other spatial forms of deixis. Action, or “function-advancing-propositions”, as 
generated through verb-phrases rather than noun-phrases, also have a world-building effect (e.g. see Gavins, 2007, 58-
63 and Lahey, 2006, 160). 
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space without any meaning or plot or narrative to help us with its decoding. Here is a pointing to 
spatial patterns of experience only, rather than temporal organisations of existence. Accordingly, 
these instances offer not situations of action, but of sensation, the argument goes, we enter a “purely 
aesthetic sphere” (Tygstrup and Simonsen, 2004, 207). In a separate article Tygstrup argues that 
these plateaus call for another approach than what our usual tools of analysis can offer: since 
description no longer functions solely in the service of narrative, we are faced with “a special mode 
of representation” or a simple showing of “sensual pieces of reality”, a “prose of ambience” that has 
“an affective impact on the reader” and defies analytical meaning (Tygstrup, 2004, 206, 213, 206, 
226; 211). 
In my view, the “special mode of representation” Tygstrup refers to is really a mode 
of presentation. And the alternative approach he asks for, which calls on the reader’s sensitivity to 
the simple spatial thereness of presentation, involves a mode of reading where the interpretation of 
meaning makes way for an affective or imaginary, but also a bodily and sensory experience of the 
work. Such a mode of reading seems to emerge from topopoetic approaches to literature as they 
come across in various scholars like Casey, Heidegger, Bachelard, as well as in Deleuze and Hans 
Ulrich Gumbrecht.  
A topopoetics, unlike a topo-interpretation, may be briefly sketched as a presence-
based approach to literature. In its revival of the placial experience in literature, or place and 
spatiality as some of the primary events in literature, it is primarily concerned with bringing back to 
our consciousness the material thingness of the world. It does so by noting how a work or a word is 
capable of producing a presence – much in the way Heidegger speaks of language as a bringing 
forth of objects, or a naming that can call things into appearance or into a sensory nearness or 
presence (e.g. see Heidegger, 1935, 41, 71; 1950, 196).3
                                                          
3 This reading of Heidegger partially rests on Jeff Malpas’ approach to Heidegger and his reading of Heidegger’s idea 
of language as a production of presence (e.g. see Malpas, 6, 70, 204, 264, 266). Besides when Heidegger says a name 
presences a being he describes it in terms of phenomena that presences themselves also to our senses (e.g. see 
Heidegger, 1935, 71).  
 In a reading like this, when the bodily 
experience is the primary focus, language becomes an event capable of triggering an intensity of 
prelinguistic, sensory experiences, which also means that the world in the literary work comes to 
stand forth as an event to be seen or heard or felt. It is that mode of reading Deleuze and Guattari 
refer to where art produces “not the resemblance but the pure sensation” of an object, when “the 
material [is] passing completely into the sensation” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 166-7, see also 
164, 168, 182-3). It is about that moment when the “meaning-effects” of language are superseded 
by the “sense-effects” of language, in Deleuze’s terms (Deleuze, 1993, 138, see also 141). Since 
settings are mostly silent, and our bodily experience of both language and place are mostly silent 
and go unnoticed, a topopoetics will have to be particularly sensitive to the silent calls in language 
of these states of sensation. Take for instance toponyms like street or park or London or the 
Piccadilly and note how they silently call forth spatial sensations in our minds when we hear them – 
before they enter any verbalised thread of meaning or narrative (place names especially are always 
evocative – or poetic – in their particularity, capable of triggering numerous intensive sense-
effects). 
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In Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway the place of London is mostly produced as a 
discursively ordered space. It is socio-culturally coded and gendered through characters’ behaviour 
and actions and conversations and thoughts. Streams-of-consciousness hardly ever escape their 
social interconnections or the socio-cultural symbols of meaning that organise the place-world of 
the characters. In this way the lives of the characters have a disembodied quality in the sense that 
they seem quite independent of the bodily sensations of the place they are in: the reader seems 
always to be inside someone’s thoughts and these thoughts always seem to be elsewhere than the 
characters’ silent or invisible bodies, or else the characters’ are more concerned with the encultured 
“meaning of phenomena” rather than with their “material presence” (Gumbrecht, 2004, xiv). This 
level of the novel offers itself to topo-intepretation: we may dissect the interpersonal relations and 
socio-cultural meanings that shape the characters’ lives and actions and draw up a socio-cultural 
geography of how these meanings fill out, encode and structure the place the characters inhabit. 
This need not result in a disembodied geography. As Lefebvre has it, the “abstract truths” of social 
space materialise as physical reality as they are “imposed on the reality of the senses, of bodies, of 
wishes and desires” or “project themselves into a space, becoming inscribed there, and in the 
process producing the space itself” (Lefebvre, 1974, 139, 129). Yet such interpretations easily fill 
the book, and space, with but discursive meanings: they endow everything with a function of 
meaning, whether socio-cultural or psychological – in the end there is hardly any space left outside 
meaning. Or, we may say that place is reduced to a sociocultural construct, however materialised, 
and that the sensory experience of the physicality of place matters very little, if anything at all (to 
repeat: our relation to the “meaning of phenomena” is a primary concern rather than the experience 
of the “material presence” of phenomena). A good example of this is the common interpretation of 
the significance of Big Ben in the novel.  
Big Ben strikes the hour of the day throughout the story. Many critics grant it the 
function of a social and temporal sign: they speak of Big Ben as an ordering of time that creates an 
abstract temporal coordination of the world as well as a temporal connection between all the 
characters. It also indicates a narrative progression of the day and it clearly suggests themes of 
ageing and lost chances in life. But at another, bodily level of reading, the sound of Big Ben is also 
just that: a sound which can be registered only physically by the senses. When stripped of its 
meanings and representations, all we have is the presence of a sound – which the reader may hear 
with the inner ear, but he or she will have to read with the body, will have to open towards the pure 
sense-effects of the word rather than its meaning-effects. And once you do this, you may also take a 
glance back at the analysis of Big Ben as a sign of time or social regulation and note how utterly 
silent that bell was when it served only the function of meaning. It is as if it mattered nothing in that 
mode of reading that it is indeed a sound. When the sound of the clock is registered only as a sound, 
it becomes a decisively spatial phenomenon and opens up the setting, the place of the novel towards 
a material and sensory dimension. And rather than creating only a temporal connection between 
characters, the sound now creates a concrete, spatial connection. The characters and their lives are 
suddenly immersed in the physicality of place: the sound of Big Ben vibrates through space – 
everyone and everything is enveloped in the sound or drawn into this now sonorous world, into this 
sound-space.  
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This is an example of what Casey, via Heidegger and Iamblichus, refers to as the in-
gathering quality of place as one of the most vital properties or affordances of place, an in-gathering 
that is here caused by one of the physical properties of the place (e.g. see Casey, 1993, 74; 2002, 
36-7; 1997, 355). Woolf helps this placial or in-gathering reading on the way by pointing to how the 
sound of Big Ben spreads “leaden circles” over the city before they mix “in a thin ethereal way with 
the clouds and wisps of smoke” and finally dissolve and die “up there among the seagulls” (Woolf, 
1925, 2, 41, 165, 82-3). You will find many other examples of basic elements of sound and smell, 
tactility and vision that physically fill up the place of Woolf’s novel in this way, or appropriates 
everything in a material way: The tactility of the weather is one example, everything is enveloped in 
the heat on this hot day in June, and shifting shades of sunlight fall on things in the book as clouds 
drift by across the sky. All these physical phenomena of place create what Paul Rodaway has called 
sensuous geographies: geographies of sound, touch, smell and vision (Rodaway, 1994).4
Rodaway notes the in-gathering power of the senses in this connection: especially 
taste, touch, smell and sound are sensations of closeness which create participatory geographies: 
they cause us to be transported into the being of a place as its properties enter our bodies through 
the senses in a rich, unfocused and unstructured way – like the boundaryless and structureless 
ambience of a sound which cannot be reduced to meaning (Rodaway, 1994, 26, 41-2, 54, 67, 96, 
107).
  
5
                                                          
4 Throughout his book Rodaway shifts between the terms “sensuous” and “sensory” and, so, “sensuous” is to be 
understood as a synonym of “sensory”.  
 In contrast the sense of the eye is far closer to our minds than our bodies: With our eyes we 
tend to look on things from a perspective outside the thing, cutting up the world into neat little 
parts. Hence the eye is often in the service of intelligibility and abstract categorisations (Rodaway, 
1994, 116-23). Unfortunately we tend to read only with our eyes: we only picture scenes while 
forgetting the rest of the body, and we use the eye only to assist the structures of meaning – as in the 
phrase “do you see what I mean?” But, silently, the eye is also synaesthetically affected by the other 
senses, as when we sense warmth or coolness in a colour (see also Rodaway, 1994, 26). This is 
crucial in a topopoetic reading where our eyes move in on very close range. We move so close that 
we cannot tell the outline of a thing or place, which is when “space is not visual, or rather the eye 
itself has a haptic, nonoptical function”, as Deleuze and Guattari put it (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 
494). Consequently, as much as these sensuous geographies may result in a bodily immersion of the 
characters in the book, they also cause the reader to be drawn into the place of the story. It is 
through the participatory geographies of the senses that the phenomenal quality of a place in a 
literary work opens up to the reader, and comes to stand forth as a sensory presence rather than just 
a socio-cultural narrative. The place of the book becomes “panperceptual”, in Casey’s words, 
5 Yet of course we always do just that: we always reduce pure meaning-less sensation of phenomena, or translate it into 
meaning after the immediate sensory registration, often almost simultaneously – the sensation enters a narrative of what 
that sound at that moment meant for us, or it enters an already existing narrative of pain or promise or frustration – 
mostly we never even experience a sensation without its mediation through such pre-established codes, which is a point 
that also runs through Woolf’s novel: “Nothing exists outside us except a state of mind”, Peter thinks, and makes an 
experiment with the sky and the branches he can see as he deliberately “endows them with womanhood” (Woolf, 1925, 
49). “Such are the visions”, he concludes, “which ceaselessly float up, pace beside, put their faces in front of, the actual 
thing; often overpowering the solitary traveller and taking away from him the sense of the earth” (Woolf, 1925, 50). 
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appealing “to the full bodily sensorium” and in that way the book quite simply sweeps us in (Casey, 
2002, 6, 29, 261). 
I will offer one more example of such a sensory geography in Woolf’s novel. 
Characters are always dosing off in the book and every time they do so, the bodily sensation of 
spatiality re-emerges from the background into the foreground. When Peter is falling asleep on a 
bench in Regents Park, thoughts give way to the body, and vision gives way to a fading registration 
of sounds:  
he closed his eyes…. A great brush swept smooth across his mind, sweeping across it 
moving branches, children’s voices, the shuffle of feet, and people passing, and 
humming traffic, rising and falling traffic. Down, down he sank (Woolf, 1925, 49).  
Here space emerges as or through synaesthetic bodily sensations. And reading this, my body cannot 
help but simulating the soft, muffled dumbness that sounds take on when one is just about to fall 
asleep in the sun on a hot summer’s day (I do not even need Woolf’s indication of these sensations 
in the following sentence: Peter sank “into the plumes of feather of sleep...and was muffled over” 
(Woolf, 1925, 49).6
As I have said, the minds of the characters in Woolf’s novel are mostly elsewhere than 
their bodies, entirely engaged within the realm of meaning, preoccupied by thought or speculation 
or conversation. But at another level of this book of the mind and society, the body and the pre-
conceptual, sensory experience of the material presence of place assumes an immense importance. 
Woolf carefully blends streams of bodily sensations into the characters’ streams of consciousness, 
just as the physical dimensions of place and emplacement are always present at a silent level of the 
novel, as with the sound of Big Ben, or as in the many spatial punctuations of Clarissa’s stream-of-
thought as she moves through the city: “she thought, walking on”, “she asked herself, walking 
towards Bond Street”, “she thought, waiting to cross”, “she thought, stepping on to the pavement” 
(Woolf, 1925, 7). Here we catch glimpses of the body-subject that carries Clarissa through a 
habitual physical environment while she pays no or only very peripheral attention to it (the spatial 
interruptions may indicate minute breaks Clarissa’s stream-of-thought as much as they may be an 
omniscient narrator’s observation of a habitual bodily movement her conscious mind pays no 
attention to). 
 
7
                                                          
6 I deliberately use the term “simulate” with reference to Jerome Feldman’s neural study of language. His research 
shows how mirror-neurons, whenever we perceive an action described in words, activate the same motor-control parts 
of the brain that are active when we carry out the action ourselves (Feldman, 2006, 68-70). Feldman deftly substitutes 
“imagine” with “simulation” to include this clear link between language, cognition and our bodily response system – 
there seems to be corporal and sensory simulation in all imagination (Feldman, 2006, 215-19). 
 The term “body-subject” has been adopted from Merleau-Ponty by humanist 
geographers like David Seamon who argues that it is because the body-subject manages routine 
demands independently of conscious thought that we gain “freedom from...everyday paces and 
 
7 Here a spatial scholar like Joseph Frank continues the one-sided reading of stream of consciousness when he sees the 
“knitting together” of the world of the modern novel as happening in “the act of thinking” (Frank, 1945, 32). The act of 
bodily sensing plays an equally important role in the production of the novel’s world, although far less obvious and 
explicit.  
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environments”, or, to put it differently, it liberates space in our minds for abstract or place-irrelevant 
thought (Seamon, 1980, 156-7).8 Yet, while there is hardly any consciousness intervening between 
environment and the movement of the body-subject, the body-subject is no less than the very 
foundation of our experience of place, he argues: Lived-space is “first of all grounded in the body”, 
in the ways in which  “a place is experienced without deliberate and self-conscious reflection”: 
“Whatever the particular historical and cultural context, the bedrock of [a person’s] geographical 
experience is the prereflective bodily stratum of [that person’s] life” (Seamon, 1980, 153, 161, 162). 
This also seems to be of great significance in Woolf’s novel. Whereas the characters in the book are 
mostly preoccupied by abstract thoughts or thoughts that pertain to an elsewhere or another time 
and place – memories of the past especially9
But there is more to the role of spatiality and bodily sensation in Woolf’s novel: they 
appear to brush against a deep existential space of human being-in-the-world. There are particular 
moments when Woolf causes the body to step out of its silent and invisible activity. These are 
moments when the physical effect of place stands out without being mediated, or re-ideationalised 
or re-cerebralised, by any apparent socio-cultural purpose or function of meaning, when the 
analytical social self is lost out of sight for a moment and physical phenomena stand out, 
unqualified by ideas or opinion, as if speaking to only to the body. At one time it is “the body 
alone” that “listens to the passing bee…the dog barking, far away barking” (Woolf, 1925, 33-4, 
emphasis added). At another time Clarissa Dalloway enters a park and is struck by the sudden 
interruption of her thoughts by “the silence; the mist; the hum”, before she starts qualifying the 
sensation of the phenomena she encounters with specific meaning (Woolf, 1925, 3). Or her 
consciousness fills with the spontaneous, unqualified emergence of things and objects in her field of 
vision, “the trees and the grass, and the little girl in pink”, “salmon on an iceblock”, “gloves and 
shoes” (Woolf, 1925, 5, 8). It is crucial that these are all brief instances. When time is compressed 
to an instant, or the immediacy of a spontaneous appearance, spatiality emerges full force. Although 
not emptied of time (a moment belongs to the temporal world), these instants come to be emptied of 
social and historical organisations of existence while immediate spatial experience reaches a 
maximum of intensity.  
 – they seem to be urging for a sense of presence, 
nonetheless, and this sense of presence seems always to depend on a return of the mind’s focus to 
the present material space as sensed by the body, in other words, a return to some kind of 
coincidence between the mind’s activity with that of the body-subject: “Clarissa (crossing to the 
dressing-table) plunged into the very heart of the moment, transfixed it, there – the moment of this 
June morning on which was the pressure of all other mornings, seeing the glass, seeing the dressing-
table, and all the bottles afresh, collecting the whole of her at one point” (Woolf, 1925, 31). 
                                                          
8 Accordingly, this bodily emplacement appears to be prior to and a basic condition that plays into any emotional or 
imaginative emplacement, the latter being the kinds of emplacement that, for instance, Yi Fu Tuan (1974) and 
Bachelard (1964), are interested in. And, possibly, a bodily emplacement may very well go along with a psychological 
or conceptual sense of displacement or less stable sense of emplacement, which seems to be the case for a character like 
Clarissa Dalloway.    
9 The careful reader will find that throughout the novel these memories are themselves infused with spatiality and 
bodily sensation – as in Proust’s experience of how the body may have loyally preserved from the past whatever the 
mind may have forgotten, how the narrator’s body, through sense-recollections, seems to remember before the brain 
does (Proust, 1913, 12). 
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These are all moments of a heightened awareness of a spatial, bodily-being-in-place 
and may cause a character like Clarissa to experience a sensation of deep, physical emplacement in 
the phenomenal world (in spite of any meaning-based sense of displacement): “wrapped in the soft 
mesh of the grey blue morning air” or as when Clarissa suddenly pays attention to the deep 
foundation of her sensory familiarity with her home: how the depth and the common activities in 
the house emerge through sounds and smells that are so familiar that they ordinarily go unnoticed 
(Woolf, 1925, 2, 8, 24, 26-7).  
But these brief moments also appear to be moments that tap into a radically different 
state-of-being that persists in relation to a larger geological scale within the most socialised or 
culturalised spaces: from a sense of personal bodily emplacement in one’s immediate and known 
surroundings they point to a radically other sense of a desocialised and deculturalised emplacement 
in the world as natural, dehumanised earth. All Clarissa’s social and cultural and historical and even 
biographical selves momentarily disappear and give way to a very material, even depersonalized, 
sensation of being in the world. Without narrative, without story, the character enters a present, 
bodily sense of being which points to nothing else than an immersion in the physicality of space: a 
human body in interaction with the natural, physical spontaneity of the world before any meaning is 
assigned. Or, to use one of Woolf’s own expressions from “The Mark on the Wall”, Clarissa’s 
socio-cultural and personal being dissolves as the impersonal body, the body alone, for a split 
second, makes a pure connection with the non-human biophysical world: the “impersonal world 
which is a proof of some existence other than ours” (Woolf, 1917, 72).10
We could also say that time seems to re-enter a natural space here. The history of the 
time/ space relation “proceeds from nature to abstraction”, says Lefebvre, and with the modern age 
the time of natural space had retreated from social space, and as time had become unstuck from the 
physical or natural world, or “[l]ived time”, it was now measured only abstractly on clocks, 
“isolated and functionally specialized as this time itself” (Lefebvre, 1974, 95). But in this other 
state-of-being in the novel time reconnects with a natural space that persists, undomesticated in the 
city of London and in the bodies of its inhabitants. At this level, the novel’s abstract time, the time 
measured by the strokes of Big Ben, vanishes in the presence of a timeless time of the phenomena 
of sounds, smells, touches, light and colours when all of these speak to “the body alone”. And it is 
also a silent geographical time of the climate, wind, sky, clouds and the topographic site on which 
the city is built. This is a natural time in which the “tides in the body”, as Woolf calls it (Woolf, 
1925, 99, 100), mutely respond to the planetary rotation of the day.
  
11
                                                          
10 We might also speak of this “other state-of-being” in terms of Foucault’s heterotopias when he understands it as 
“those singular spaces to be found in some given social spaces whose functions are different or even the opposite of 
others” (Foucault in Rabinow, 1982, 20). But the heterotopia I find in Woolf is outside specific function and it is 
certainly not a “counter-space” (see Foucault, 1967, 24) as it counters nothing. More appropriately this other-state-of-
being in place may be seen in terms of Lefebvre’s idea of the polyrhythms that fill out all places. To Lefebvre natural, 
biological rhythms - including the physiological rhythms of the body - and the imposed or incorporated rhythms of 
social time amount to a multiplicity of space-time relations that co-exist within a single location, or a single body 
(Lefebvre, 1992, e.g. see 39-45, 73-5, 81). 
 Within this mode the text 
 
11 Lefebvre’s historical analysis of time’s change “from nature to abstraction” appears to be in agreement with 
Bakhtin’s thesis of the increasing severance of time in modern life from the world’s “crude physicality” and “natural 
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itself performs a topopoetic, bodily reading of the world, and throws this reading back on the rest of 
the book where every single word may be re-invested with a bodily, sensory dimension – or at least 
it keeps pointing to the bodily relation to the material presence of space that is silently but 
perpetually at work while the characters’ minds are preoccupied with an elsewhere.  
 
Conclusion 
In a geographical reading of Woolf’s novel the socio-cultural construction of space is what 
immediately leaps to the eye, but the text opens to more geographies than geographies of meaning. 
Once we start tracing the bodily geographies in Mrs. Dalloway it appears that all the socio-cultural 
constructions or experiences of place start flickering back and forth along with another, sensory 
experience of place that is not completely absorbed by the codes of social space – and, with the 
latter, we even get the sense of an undomesticated, natural geography amidst the modern city that 
effects radically other modes of being-in-a-place (although these are of course not to be understood 
as alternative modes of dwelling outside social space). Or, to put it another way: the occasional 
glimpses of bare physical experiences of the place, the moments of “the body alone” , disappear and 
reappear as a character shifts back and forth between different modes of being-in-a-place.  
That is the genius of place that Woolf’s novel makes happen: the multiple place-
worlds and modalities of experience that co-occur within a single place, or even within a single 
moment. Any study of the geography of socio-cultural meaning in Mrs. Dalloway will find the text 
reverberating with a pluralism of meaning, a heterotopos that is a heteroglossia, but once we delve 
into a sensory geography too, another dimension is added: we are no longer counting the number of 
meanings, we are no longer destabilising meaning with other meanings; here it is the sensory 
dimensions of words – the pure sense-effects that words may trigger – that cause the text to keep 
reverberating, to escape any singular meaning. The sensory dimension of the text cause the text to 
keep slipping out of our grasps of interpretation and definition altogether: that is what cultural and 
discourse analysis alone cannot communicate in our experience of a work like this – or in our 
experience of place in literature. 
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